The Subjectivity Of Experience Can Be Accounted For...

In this paper, I will discuss whether the subjectivity of experience can be accounted for adequately with a functionalist theory. By defining mental contents in terms of their causal roles, phenomenological experience is no longer confined to a private realm, but can be specified by counterfactual statements that are intelligible to others. In this paper, I argue that the subjectivity of experience cannot be completely characterized by language with a functionalist theory by examining the meanings of language and the contents of mental states. I conclude that a functionalist theory can only provide an approximate sketch of the major features of subjective experience while leaving subtle details out of the picture. Functionalism is a view†¦show more content†¦Hence, phenomenological mental states can also be specified by its causal role and thus become public. In this way, with functionalism, mental states are defined by their causal roles, which leaves no trace of introspectivist residue. However, in more complicated cases, my mental states can be affected by more than one factors, which eventually causes a mere disposition in me to certain actions rather than performing that action. If severe pain makes me want to scream, yet I believe that screaming in public is inappropriate, I will endure the discomfort and act like a normal person. In this case, although my mental state of being in pain is private, it is not essentially private, and can be made public by language. I can hide my misery; nonetheless, the moment when I say â€Å"I am in pain,† my mental state becomes public, because the meaning of pain is shared by others. Hence, with a functionalist theory of mental content and the usage of language, the subjectivity of personal experience can be disclosed. It must be granted that meanings of terms are a public property; otherwise, communication will become an impossible project. However, whether the subjectivity of personal experience can be fully accounted for remains questionable. The meaning of a word is defined by its sense and reference jointly. The object to which a word refers determines what it essentially signifies, while the way that the word represents the object determines how it will be used in